Many authors have observed that changes in the prim of oil on world markets appear to have a significant effect on economic activity. Rasche and Tatom (1981) , Darby (1982) , Hamilton (1983 Hamilton ( , 1995 , Burbidge and Harrison (1984) , Gisser and Goodwin (1986) , Mork (1989) , Carruth, Hooker and Oswald (1995) , and others argue that oil prim shocks were responsible for substantial aggregate fluctuations in recent decades. In spite of this voluminous empirical hterature suggesting that oil prim shocks have an important effect on emnornic activity, there is little consensus on the re=n why this is so.
It is easily argued that an exogenous increase in the cost of a factor of production should reduce the quantity of final output that firms will choose to supply. What is less obvious is that the effect should be significant, if the factor of production in question accounts for only a small part of the total marginal mst of production, as is true of energy rests. Ind&d, we present below a numerical estimate of the predicted effect of an increase in energy pric= in a 'calibrated" onesector stoch=tic growth model, and show that while the oil price increase is, predicted to mntr=t output, the effect is only about a' fifth the six of the response that we estimate using U.S. data. A ten percent innovation in the price of oil is predicted to contract private sector output by about one-half a percent~our estimat= indicate instead that such ,,. ....6,, an innovation h= on average been associated with an output decline of 2.5 percent, five or" six quarters after the innovation.
The observed effects of oil shocks are even more puzzling when the effects on real wages me considered -well. In standard growth models, the predicted contraction of the supply of output is greater the less real wages fall in response to the shock, and is greatest if real wage actually incre=e (perhaps because the product wage rises relative to the consumption wage). Thus high real wages play a crucial role in explanations like that of Bruno and Sachs (1985) of the effects of the oil shocks of the 1970's. Yet, like Bohi (1989) and Keane and Prasad (1991) , we find that oil shocks typically reduce real wages. Our estimates suggest real wages fall by nearly one percent (again, five or six quarters after the innovation) for each ten percent innovation in oil prices. This is again nearly five times as large an effect as our calibrated growth model would predict. But more to the point, variations in the specification of labor supply behavior (a point on which our model is obviously open to criticism) that would improve the model's ability to account for a sharp output decline (by predicting a greater degrm of 'real wage resistance") would result in even less ability to account for the observed decline in real wag=, and vice versa. This sugg=ts that it is the growth model's simple specification of output supply that must be rejected, rather than its model of labor supply behavior. '
The alternative that we explore in this paper mntinues to =sume a simple aggregative model of output supply, but drops the assumption that firms produce for a perfectly competitive product market. Instead, we consider the effects of several simple models of imperfect competition in the product market, introduced in our previous papers (1991, 1992, 1995) .
We find that allowing for a modest degree of imperfect competition significantly increases the predicted effects of an energy price increase on both output and real wages. In particular, we show that a model involving implicit collusion betw=n oligopolists can auount for declines in both output and real wages of the magnitude that we =timate.
This study complements our previous work on the effects of innovations in military purchases on output and real wages (1992) . As in that study, we are interested in the effects of oil price changm not simply because they appear to have been an important source of aggregate fluctuations in the U.S. in rewnt decades, but above all because variations in oil prices represent a particularly good example of an exogenous shock that can be directly identified in the data. As Hamilton (1985) h= argued, there is little reason to believe that changes in the price of oil represent responses to U.S. economic conditions, and in particular little reuon to believe that they should be correlated with changes in the U.S. production technology. Indeed, this h= led authors such as Mmey (1991) and Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1990 to use oil price changes as demand-shock instruments for other purposes. We follow them in this identifying assumption.
We proceed as follows. In section 1, we estimate the responses of private sector output lIn particular, we do not believe that simply replacing the neoclassical labor supply curve by an efficiency wage schedule, aa propoeed by C~ruth, Hooker and Oswald (1995), would significantly improve upon the predictions of the neoclassical g:owth model. and real wages to oil price increases. This section provides the facts that we then seek to explain. Section 2 gives an intuitive discussion of why the existence of imperfect mmpetition accentuat~the reductions in output and real wages. Section 3 presents the class of aggregative intertemporal general equilibrium models that we analyze numerical y. We show that a single specification allows us to nest = special cases a model with perfectly competitive product markets (closely related to the model of Kim and Loungani (1992) ), a model with monopolist ically competitive product markets, a model with Ucustomer markets~in the style of Phelps and Winter (1970) , and a model with implicit collusion in the style of our (1992) paper. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the models. Section 5 compares the numerical r=ponses of output and real wages implied by our various models with the estimated responses from section 1. Section 6 concludes.
The Observed Effects of Energy Price Shocks
In this section we discuss our =timates of the effects on the U.S. economy of a shock to world oil prices. In the models we discuss below, the variable that matters for the determination of output and real wages is the reai price of energy, rather than the level of nominal energy prices. Thus it might seem that we should simply seek to identify the effects of innovations in the real price of energy. But this method would not identify a shock that we can plausibly treat as exogenous with respect to other shocks to the U.S. economy. mat is more plausibly exogenous in the period we study is the nominal prim of energy.
The reasons for this, u explaind in Hamilton (1985) , have to do with the institutions that set oil prices in this period. As he documents, the nominal U.S. price of oil in the pre-OPEC period w-set to a large degree by the Tex= Wlroad Commission (TRC). The TRC tended to keep the nominal price constant (and allowed the quantity produmd to fluctuate so demand would be met) unless a large exogenous disturbance occurred. Thus, the nominal pria was changed in 1952 as a result of the Iranian nationalization of oil assets, in 1956
as a r-ult of the Suez crisis and so on. The policy of keeping the dollar price of oil fixed betw=n major realignments (that coincided with exogenous disturbanm) wu maintained in , the OPEC era. Indeed, Hamilton (1985) quotes Kuwait's oil minister M saying the nominal oil prim "should be fromn so that the real price (adjusted for inflation) ... would fall for two or three years". As a r=ult of this policy the two major changes in nominal oil pric= in this era were the 1973 oil embargo in response to the Arab-lsrmli war and the 1979 increme in response to the Iranian revolution.
The policy of kmping the nominal oil price nearly constant between major realignments caused by exogenous events means that innovations in the real price of oil can also be due to unforecatable changes in U.S. inflation. These innovations in U.S. inflation need not be exogenous with respect to U.S. technology shocks, taste shocks, and the like. We therefore consider the bivariate stoch=tic process for nominal oil prices and a nominal price index for the U. S., and orthogonalize the two innovations by assuming that the shock of interest to us may affect both nominal oil prices and U.S. inflation, but that the orthogonal shock has no eflect on nominal oil pn"ces within the quarter. Thus, it is the innovation in the nominal oil price that actually identifies the exogenous shock that we are inter= ted in. But it is only the effect of this shock on the forecasted path of the mal oil price that matters for the predictions of our theoretical models about the effects of the shock.
This identifying =sumption is not equally defensible over the entire period for which we have data. We believe that it makes sense for both the pre-OPEC and the OPEC periods.
But sometime in the early 1980's, OPEC lost its ability to keep the nominal price of oil relatively stable. It is reasonable to assume that after this point variations in the demand for oil (and even news about its future demand, as it is a storable commodity) began to be reflected in for nominal 1980's. For nominal oil prices immediately. Indeed, simple examination of the time series oil prims suggests that these prices are no longer formed in the same way in the instance, quarters with nominal oil prims the same as in the previous quarter no longer occur. Furthermore, the growth rate of nominal oil prices is much more rapidly mean-reverting in this period than it had bmn previously.
The question is then when the period of exogenous nominal oil price changes ends and that of endogenous nominal oil price changes begins. Many observers agree that OPEC lost much of its power to raise pric= in the 1980's but the exact date of the break in OPEC's hold over the oil market is much more controversial. We approach this question by observing that the stochastic process for nominal oil prices is quite different in the 80's than in the earlier period, and supposing that the proper date at which to truncate our sample is the date at which this univariate promss changes. As is standard in the literature (see Andrews 1993) we suppose that the most likely date of such a regime change is the point which maximizes the F-statistic for a break in regime. We thus consider a regression that explains the current quarterly percentage change in the nominal price of oil with a constant and two lags of the dependent variable. We use the producer price index for crude petroleum products as our nominal price of oil and our dependent variable runs from the fourth quarter of 1947 until the swond quarter of 1989. The maximal F-statistic for a break equals 5.92 and arises when the first part of the sample includes only data until the third quarter of 1980. 2 The likelihood ratio for a sample break at the beginning of the OPEC regime is much smaller.
The likelihood that the break occurred in 1986 when the Saudis retaliated against prim chiseling by severely lowering their price is larger but still lower than the likelihood that it occurred in 1980:3. We thus use this u our break point and only consider the effect of nominal oil price changes before this date.
Analysis of the time series for nominal oil prices and the U.S. price level indicates that both series are stationary only in first differences. However their ratio, the real prim of oil, appears to be stationary SG that the series are cointegrated. We thus estimate a bivariate vector autoregression for the two stationary series, the growth rate of nominal oil prices and the logarithm of the real price of oil. The first of our two equations mak~the current change in the logarithm of the dollar price of oil (~E~) a function of a constant, a time trend, and lags of this change = well = lags of the logarithm of the real price of oil (p~t), defined as We truncated the lags in both equations when the next lag had a t-statistic below one. The estimated coefficients for these two equations are given in the first two columns of Table 1 .
Treating the innovations in the first of these variables as our exogenous shock, we can combine these equations to obtain the impulse response of the real price of oil. This impulse response is plotted in Figure la together with confidence intervals of plus and minus two times the standard error. 3 The U.S. general price level responds very little to contemporanmus incre== in the nominal price of oil so that the increase in the real price of oil is almost as large as the innovation in the nominal oil price (.98 percent for each one percent innovation in the growth rate of nominal oil prices). The real price of oil continues to rise after this point because the nominal price of oil tends to rise further. The peak real oil price occurs after 5-7 quarters (about 1.6 percent higher for each one percent initial innovation in the nominal oil prim). Then, M the higher real price of oil leads the general price level to increase by more than average and leads nominal oil pric~to grow by less than average, the real price of oil returns gradually to its unconditional expected value.
We also analyze the effects of this type of shock on output and the real wage. We measure the first by the real value added produced by the private sector which we compute by subtr~ting government value added from total GNP. Our private value added deflator is then the ratio of nominal to real private value added. Our real wage is computed by dividing hourly earnings in manufacturing by the private value added deflator. We focus on private value added rather than total GNP because our theories of pricing and production decisions (whether competitive or imperfmtly competitive) do not apply to the government. 4 We run separate regressions explaining the logarithm of each of these two variables with two lags of the dependent variable, a time trend, the current value as well = lags of~E~, and 3The stmdard errors are calculated using the procedure of Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986). 4We would prefer to eliminate the U.S. oil industry as well, but we lack these data.
lags of the logarithm of pE:. 5 The results using data from 1948:2 to 1980:3 are given in the second two mlumns of Table 1 . Once again, we truncated the lags so that the final lag has a t-statistic greater than one. Combining the regressions in the first two columns with these latter regr-sions we obtain the impulse responses for the output and the real wage.
These are displayed in Figures 6 One interesting feature of this decline is that output is lower in the second year following the innovation than in the first (which is also when real oil prices reach their peak). Indeed, the decline is statistically significant only from quarter 3 onward. 7
Figure lC shows the effect on the real wage. This too declines following an increase in oil prims. Once again, the maximum decline occurs only in the second year (when it is nearly -.10 percent for each one percent increase in oil prices), although in this case the decline is statistically significant even during the first year. 8
As noted in the introduction, the simultaneous observation of sharp declines in both output and real wages is hard to explain within the context of an aggregative competitive model. To clarify this, we first discuss a stripped-down model based on Gordon (1984) .
Then we turn to a more elaborate set of models and compare their quantitative predictions
'An alternative ia to analyze the effect of changes in the nominal price of oil in a VAR consisting of changes in the nominal oil price, the real price of oil, output and the real wage. We considered such a VAR as well and obtained results that are essentially identical to those in the text. We report results based on the regr-ions because the fact that they contain fewer nuisance parameters mak= the estimata and their standard errora easier to interpret and, perhaps, more reliable.
'In regressions that are not reported we also analyzed the response of hours worked in the private sector and of the unemployment rate. Oil price increases lead hours to fall and unemployment to rise aa can be expected from the fall in output. The increase in unemployment, as usual, lags behind the falls in output. 'Carruth Hooker, and Oswald (1995) similarly find that the effects of an oil price shock on unemployment are greateat after 7-8 quarters.
'Because this is the empirical finding of greatest significance for our analysis, we checked its robustn= in several ways. We reran the regr~ions dropping the 1974 observations and we also considered separate regression for the pre-and post-1974 subsamples.
All of these regressions reproduced the negative effect of nominal oil prices on the real wage though the standard errors were larger because IMS data were included.
to those of Figure 1 .
Oil Price Shocks and Labor Demand: The Role of Imperfect Competition
For purposes of this illustration, we first consider the extremely simplified production structure of Gordon (1984) which abstracts from capital and materials inputs. We consider an emnomy combines with many symmetric firms and a fixed supply of capital. Emh of these firms labor and energy to produce output using the following production function
where Ht, Et and Yt represent each firm's labor input, energy input and output respectively.
We assume that both the V and the Q functions are increasing in their arguments. We introduce the V function because we wish to view V w value added, which is produced with labor and capital. The introduction of the V function also allows us to assume that Q is homogenmus of degrm one in its two arguments, while diminishing returns (due to the fixity of capital) are represented solely by the strict concavity of V.
Choice of the inputs E and H so as to minimize costs of production in each period implies that, at each time t, there exists a value pl such that
where pE~and wt denote the prices of energy and labor inputs respectively, each deflated by the price of the output good. The quantity pt represents the inverse of the Lagrange multiplier~sociated with the requirement that the firm produce a given level of output. It also denotes the ratio of the price of the output good to its marginal cost of production.
Thus, in the case of perfect competition, these conditions must hold in equilibrium with pt = 1 at all times.
the extent to which Followi~g Gordon (1984) , we hold hours worked constant and we study output and real wages decline when p~f ris=.
Differentiation of (l), (2) and (3), keeping pt equal to one, yields
where SE denotes the share of energy costs in the value of total output, pEE/Q, CEV denotes the elasticity of substitution between energy inputs and value added V, and A denotes the logarithmic derivative (i.e., AX is the derivative of log X). These equations imply that
As Gordon (1984) argues, the elasticity of substitution of energy for value added,~Ev, must be less than one. Otherwise, the model would be inconsistent with the rise in the share of energy as a fraction of total costs that follows increases in energy prices. The percentage declin~in both output and the real wage deflated by the price of output must thus be smaller than the ratio of energy costs to value added (SE/l -sE ) times the percentage increase in energy prices. In the U. S., the ratio of energy costs to value added is about 0.04, so that the decline in both quantiti~must be quite small. 9 While it is possible to obtain larger declines in output if employment falls, such reductions in employment would require that the real wage fall by even l~s than is indicated by the above calculation. Thus one cannot obtain substantial declines in both output and real wages.
In f~t, such real wage declines u it k possible to obtain in this model occur only when one deflates by the price of gross output rather than a value-added deflator. It is useful to define the value-added price deflator
'See section 4 for further discussion of the size of Lhia parameter,
In the case where the Q function takes the Leontieff form, this corresponds to the standard GDP deflator. For other production functions the two do not coincide, but pvt is an "ideal"
(Divisia) valu~added deflator. In the case of perfect competition, (2)- (4) can be combined to yield
v~(H,) =~(5)
pvt Thus, in terms of the valu~added-deflated real wage, we obtain a labor demand curve that is invariant with respect to changes in the prim of energy. This means that the competitive model can account for a fall in output and employment onfy if the real wage in terms of value added rises. 10
This labor demand curve provides a useful point of view from which to see why allowanm for imperfect competition matters. When pt differs from 1, equations (2)- (4) yield instead (6) where $Et is the time t energy share, pEt~t/Qt. Equation (6) gives two reasons for the value added-deflated real wage associated with a given level of employment to decline when energy prices rise. The first is that this real wage would fall if the increase in energy prices led to an increase in the markup pl. The semnd is that, even with a fixed markup, the term in square brwkets will rise as long as the energy share sEt rises and the markup exceeds one.
In particular, holding the rriarkup and employment constant, we obtain
As long as the elasticity of substitution~Ev <1, the share of energy sE~rises with an increwe in the price of energy, so that the real wage declines. Moreover, the required percentage decline is bigger, the larger is the markup.
The intuition for this result is clearest in the case where there is a fixed amount of energy needed to produce each unit of final good. Suppose that, initially, the production of 10Thus an ener~price incre& is not equivalent to an adverse technology shock, which would shift this labor demand curve. Energy price incre-s are treated as equivalent in the standard textbook view. a product requires one dollars' worth of energy and that the price of energy inputs rises by 20 percent. Perfectly competitive firms would be willing to keep their employment mnstant with a mnstant nominal wage as long a their output prices rise by 20 cents. Such an increase in prices would keep the value-added deflator constant. Imperfectly competitive firms whose employment stayed constant would raise their price by more because they mark up their entire marginal cost. With a markup of 1.5, the 20 wnt incre~e in their unit costs leads them to raise their prices by 30 cents. Thus, the value-added-deflated wage of these firms must fall if they are to keep their employment constant.
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A Dynamic General Equilibrium Simulation Model
We now consider a more general production function and construct a general equilibrium model that, except for considering imperfect competition, is similar to those analymd by Kim and Loungani (1992) and Finn (1991) , =pecially the former. In particular, we follow the real business cycle literature in~suming that mnsumption and labor supply decisions are made by a representative household.
We consider an economy with many symmetric firms. Each firm has a production function of the general form
where~, Et and M~repr=ent each firm's gross output, energy input and materials input respectively, and Vt is an index of primary inputs (capital and labor) that represents an ideal index of value added. Both aggregator functions Q and G are assumed to be homogenmus degree one, incre~ing in their arguments, and concave. This specification generalizes that of Bruno and Sachs (1985) to allow for materials costs. The value-added index is~sumed to be given by
Here Kt repr~ents capital inputs, Ht represents hours, Zt is an index of labor augmenting technical progress, and @t represents fixed costs of production. Both Zt and Ot are exogenous parameters from the point of view of the firm. We assume a deterministic time trend in Zt in order to acmunt for the observed trend growth in per capita U.S. output. In each of our imperfectly competitive models, we assume a positive value for @c, so that the model reproduces the apparent absence of significant pure profits in U.S. industry despite the presenm of market power. A time trend is allowed for the fixed costs as well, so that we can have a steady state equilibrium growth path in which the share of fixed costs in total costs is constant over time.
Choice of the inputs E, M, and H so M to minimize costs of (given the capital stock and the quantity produced) then implies exists a markup pi such that 
ztQv(Vf, G(Et, Mt))F~(Kt, ztHt) = ptwt (12) where pEt, pM~, and Wt denote the prices of energy, materials and labor inputs respectively, emh deflated by the price of the output good. In our symmetric equilibrium, we set the prim 
NtC(wt, At)
where 6 is the constant rate of depreciation of the capital stock, satisfying O <6 s 1, and G:
denotes government purchases of produced non-energy goods. Equation (15) is the stmdard GNP accounting identity, except that we do not munt value added by the government sector or by the domestic oil industry u part of either Gt or Yt. Note that we assume that the materials used in each firm's production come out of other firms' production: a single produced good is both an intermediate good (materials) and a final good (consumption, inv=tment, and government purch~es). 13
12See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) for further discussion.
13T0 be more precise, we assume that there are many differentiated goods (and services), but comider only a symmetric equilibrium in which each is produced in the same quantity and sold for the same price.
In such a setup there is no problem in assuming that firms must purch~e other firms' products to use in
Equations (14) and (15) (1991, 1995) . The first, which is based on monopolistic competition and of homothetic t~tes over bundl= of differentiated goods, r-ults in a greater than one. This markup depends upon the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods and the homothetiticity of preferenc= implies that this elasticity is always the same in a symmetric equilibrium.
We also show in titemberg and Woodford (1991 ) that two quite different types of models with varying markups imply that dmired markups depend only on the ratio of Xt to Yt where
Xt is the present discounted value of profits gross of fixed costs. Thus both models imply their own production, even though these intermediate goods are sold for a price higher than their marginal production cat. 14This specification haa the benefit of great simplicity even if it is not M realistic as one would wish. We obtained essentially identical results when we followed Kim and Loungani ( 
The parameter a in (18) measures the rate at which new products are created as well as the probability that any mllusive agrmment or stock of loyal customers will survive until the next period. Its role is discussed at length in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) .
According to the customer market model of Phelps and Winter (1970) , the function p is decreasing in its argument The reason is that firms in the customer market model set prices by trading off the benefit from exploiting existing customers (whose elasticity of demand is very low) with the benefit from expanding their customer base by attracting new customers (whose elasticity of demand is higher). Expanding the customer base is attractive because these customers will, at a later date, have low elasticities of demand. Thought of in this way, it is apparent that such firms will set high prices when demand by current customers is high relative to the demand that can be expected by future customers. Also, prices will be low if the profits from future sales are more valuable because interest rates are low. Thus, high values of X/Y which repr~nt either high sales in the future, low interest rates or low sales today, lead to low markups.
By contrwt, the function p is increasing in its argument in the implicit collusion model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) . In this model, the markup is set at the highest level consistent with having no firm deviate from the collusive understanding. The deviations are prevented by the threat that they will be followed by periods of very low profitability (price wars). The most effective of these punishments (and also the simplest to analyze) is such that, starting the period after the deviation, the present discounted value of profits is mro. This means that a deviating firm gives up Xt. On the other hand, deviations are more attractive in the present period when sales are higher (because a deviating firm captura more sales from its competitors) and when the markup is higher (because this means that there are more profits to obtain by undercutting the going price slightly (8)- (12) and (14)- (18), given the exogenous processes {pEt,
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Gt, Zt, Nt, @t}.
Calibration of Model Parameter Values
In the next section we report the predicted responses of output and real wages to small changes in pE~, in both the competitive and imperfectly competitive versions of the model just described. We analyze the response to shocks by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1995) , The coefficients of the log-linearized equilibrium conditions involve various parameters, many of which are standard from real business cycle models, but others of which arise only because of our explicit treatment of energy and materials, or because of our allowance for imperfect competition and incre~ing returns. We 'calibrate~these parameter values to be consistent with various measured features of the U.S. economy, Finally, the simulations depend on specifying thmretical constructs that correspond to our empirical me~ures of output and the real wage. We deal with thee issues in turn.
We ensure that the equilibrium involves stationary fluctuations in suitably resealed state variables, despite trend growth of population and productivity, by making certain additional homogeneity assumptions. First, we assume that the representative household's preferences imply that there exists a u >0 such that H(w, A) is homogeneous of degree zero in (w, J%), and that C(w,~) is homogeneous of degree one in (w, A%). 15 Second, we assume that the exogenous forcing variables {Gt/z~N~}, {@t/ztN~} {Nt+l /Nt }, {zt+l/z~} and {pE~} are each stationary, even tbough { Zt} and {Nt } are only difference-stationary. Given these 15The family of utility functions u with this property is discussed in King, Plosser and Wbelo (1988 The coefficients of the log-linearized conditions are all functions of the model parameters listed in Table 2 . We first discuss the parameters relating to the production function. The only properties of the function G that matter for the log-linearized equilibrium conditions are the steady-state value oi sE/sM, where SE and SM denote the respective shares of energy and materials in the value of gross output, and CEM, the elasticity of substitution between energy and materials inputs, also evaluated at the steady-state factor mix. Similarly, the only relevant properties of the functions F and Q are summarized by the steady-state values of four more parameters: the ratio of labor rests to capital costs, the ratio of intermediate input rests to the cost of value added, and the two elasticities of substitution CKH and EVG.
The log-linearization of the transformed (9) involves coefficients that depend also upon the steady state value of @/V, the ratio of fixed costs to value added. Hence this ratio is another parameter that rn~st be given a numerical value; it indicates the degree to which there are increasing returns in the production of value added. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , which we follow in the calibration of several parameters, we assume that this ratio takes the value required for zero pure profits in the steady state. 16 We thus~sume that
where p denote the ratio of price to marginal cost in steady state. As a result, the ratio @/V is not listed among the parameters that must be fixed independently in Table 2 . Equation (19) also implies that the steady-state shares of the various factor costs in the value of gross product are equal to their share in total costs. Thus the share ratios just referred to are all derivable from the shares 3H, SK, sE, and sM listed in Table 2 , and the latter quantities reprment only three independent parameters, as they must sum to 1.
We assign numerical values to the six independent production function parameters as follows. In the U. S., the value of oil inputs is at most 4 percent of total value added. Value added in the mining of oil amounts to 1.870 of GDP on average. Imports of crude petroleum, mineral fuels, and lubricants are another 1.670 on average. Thus the value of oil inputs is about 3.4% of total value added. Even if one counts other energy inputs that might be thought to be close substitutes for oil (so that their prices increase to a similar extent, relative to other goods, when oil prices increase), the figure does not become much larger;
for example, mining of coal amounts to only 0.4% of GDP. Hence sE/(l -9E -9M) should equal approximately .04.
Next, we asume that materials constitute 50% of costs. This is less than the 60% share indicated by the Berndt and Wood (1979) data for the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have used a slightly lower number on the grounds that many service sector industries appear to have lower materialg requirements. Thus we set sM equal to 0.5 and SE equal to 0.02. It follows that materials and energy, together, account for 52% of costs. We then obtain the labor and capital shares by assuming, M in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , that labor 16Thia is presumably ensured by entry decisions over the long run, not explicitly modeled on the assumption that they are of little importance for short-run dynamics. Note that it requires that fixed costs grow at the same trend rate as output, pr~umdly thmu~an incre~in the number of firma at a constant scale of operation. See Wternberg and Woodford (1995) for further discussion.
accounts for 7570 of value added. Thus sH and SK are set equal to 0.36 and 0.12 respectively We follow the real business cycle literature in~suming that the elasticity of substitution tKH between capital and labor in the production of value added equals 1. The other two elasticities of substitution are less often considered.
We consider two different values for each. One possibilityy is to~sume very lit tIe opportunity for substitution away from either materials or energy inputs (which we represent by making both elasticities equal .0001). This is suggested by the estimates of Berndt and Wood (1979) . On the other hand, other studi=, such as Pindyck and Rote.mberg (1983) , suggest some degree of substitutability. We do not attempt to use their parameter values, as their production function specification is not consistent with the one we~sume here. Instead, we have direct 1y estimated the elasticities of substitution Cvc and CEM under assumptions consistent with our model specification, using data for 20 two-digit U.S. manuf=turing sectors. This estimation is described in the Appendix. Based on these estimates, our values for the two elasticities are eEM = 0.18 and tvc = .69.
As shown in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , the homogeneity assumptions described above imply that all the aspects of preferenus that matter for our analysis can be d=cribed by the two parameters CHWand the u. The former is a me~ure of the response of labor supply to a temporary real wage change, that is sometimes called the 'intertemporal elasticity of labor supply" in the labor literature (e.g., Card, 1994) . The latter parameter (introdumd above in our statement of our homogeneity assumptions) corresponds to the elwticity of consumption growth with respect to chang~in the real rate of return, holding constant hours worked in both periods. We assume an intertemporal elasticity of labor supply of 1.3, and a o of 2. Th-e values follow Wtemberg and Woodford (1992) Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , where they are discussed in more detail.
Finally, we must specify three parameters relating to the equilibrium behavior of markups.
The first is the steady-state value of the markup itself, p. The value that we use for all of our imperfectly competitive models is p = 1.2. This implies that for the typical firm, price is 20% higher than marginal cost, while fixed costs account for one sixth of its total costs. As This parameter is the one that distinguishes our several imperfectly competitive models. In the static monopolistic competition model, u in the competitive model, Cu is zero, as the markup is constant. For the customer market model we let eP equal -1 while we assume that it equals .15 for the implicit collusion model. (We must assume a positive value less than .2 in the latter case, for theoretical consistency, as explained in Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992 .) The third parameter that must be calibrated is the a appearing in equation (18).
(Note that this parameter matters only in the case of the two variablemarkup models.) Here we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) in setting a = .9.
When we present our simulations, we report the response of real private value added and of a real wage to energy price shocks. These simulated response are intended to correspond to the responses of the time series that are measured by the U.S. Department of Commerce. We furthermore assume that the fraction of energy inputs that are counted as dome tic production is a constant, i.e., that E: = sDEt (20) for some fraction O < sD < 1. This equation is somewhat arbitrary (since we do not here model the production or pricing decisions of energy producers explicitly). In the simulations reported, we Set sD = .5, as this represents the approximate share of U.S. oil usage that is domestically produwd. Note that the specification (20) probably overstates the negative effects on U.S. energy production of a reduction in U.S. energy demand due to a price increase.
Thus our results probably exaggerate the extent to which the models (both competitive and imperfectly competitive) predict a reduction of U.S. private value added following such a shock.
The Corr-pending private value added value added measure by the real measure.
deflator is defined by dividing the above nominal
Hence the real wage plotted in the figures is not zut, but rather
Results of Simulations
Figures 2a and 2b display the theoretical responses of output and the real wage respectively, under the parameter values just discussed. 1s As with all the results we will present, the response is ca.lculatd for ten quarters following a unit innovation in i~t. The predictions of four theoretical models are compared: the competitive model, the static monopolistic competition model, the customer market model, and the implicit collusion model. In these figurwe also reproduce the~timated impulse responses (with confidence bands) from
Figures lb and lC for purposa of comparison.
In Figure 2a , we show the predicted response of private value added. For our parameter values, the competitive model does predict a contraction of output following a positive innovation in oil prims. However, this contraction is much smaller than is indicated in Figure   lb . Output never falls by more than .06 percent in response to a one percent innovation in oil prices, which is only on~fourth of the effect that we estimate for quarters 5-7 following the innovation. Consistent with our heuristic discussion of section 2, the predicted response for the competitive model lies above the +2s.e. boundary of the confidence band in quarters 4 through 9.
The competitive version of our model also fails to predict that the decline in output should be significantly greater in the second year than in the quarters immediately following the impact. This means that the erosion of the capital stock following an ener~price increase do= not substantially increme the predicted output decline. Hence, to a useful approximation, the predicted effect of an oil shock in the competitive model can be determined in a framework where the capital stock is treated w given (as in our informal discussion in section 2). It also suggests that our oversimplified treatment of investment demand, ab- stracting from adjustment costs of any kind, is probably innocuous, at le~t for our analysis of the competitive model.
Imperfectly competitive models are able to account for a more severe contraction. Simply =suming a constant markup of 1.2 results in a predicted output decline of -.13 by quarters 5-8, which is twice as large m the one we obtain when p = 1. The implicit collusion model with p = 1.2 and EU= .15 predicts an even larger decline, more than -.20 from quarter 5 onward. The allowance for endogenous markup variation thus makes the maximum output contraction 5070 larger wit bout any change in the assumed steady-state markup, and makes it comparable to the estimated decline.
The model with implicit collusion implies larger output declines because it predicts an incre~e in markups. Markups rise for two reasons. First, the incre=ed price of energy inputs lowers the return tc capital. In the event of a permanent incre~e in energy pric-, the equilibrium capital sto":k would eventually fall u a result, but in the transition period, real interat rates would be lower than normal. As a result, the present value of future profits increases. This raises X,/~and, as a result, markups are higher until the capital stock adjusts and the real rate returns to its steady-state value.
Second, as is clear from the estimates in Table 1 and as is shown in Figure la , a shock to energy prims is generally followed by further increases in nominal and real energy prices.
Starting around six quarters after the shock, real energy prices are expected to decline back to their usual value. Thee expected declines further increase Xt/ Yt at that time. The re~on is that they imply that sales at that point are low and production costs are high relative to the values thee variables are expected to have in the future. This means that the temptation to undercut the implicitly collusive agreement at the risk of a future breakdown in collusion is unusually low, and the degree of collusion that can be sustained is accordingly unusually high. Thus this model correctly predicts that the main contraction of output should occur only in the semnd year following the innovation, since it is at this time, when real energy prims are not only high but are also expected to decline, that Xt/ Yt is significantly above its steady-state value. 19
The customer market model, bycontr~t, predicts alarger immediate contraction than does the constant-markup model, but less of a contraction in the second year. This is again because Xt /Y~rises in the second year, which in this model impli~markup reductions, as firms sacrifice current profits to compete more vigorously for their future customer base.
Thus the assumption of customer markets r~ults in a 1=s successful prediction, even compared to the static model of monopolistic competition. Given our parameter values, the implicit collusion model is the only one whose predicted path for output is always within the confidence band.
The competitive version of our model has particular difficulty in explaining the observed decline in real wagm following an oil price increase. In the case of the wage deflated by the Commerce Department's value-added deflator (Figure 2b ), the competitive model predicts a very small real wage decline, only a fourth of the~timated decline in the semnd year.
This decline is entirely due to the dom=tic production energy, which raises the value-added deflator. As in the previous figure, this model predicts little additional decline in the semnd year (the decline by the middle of the second year is only about a third larger than the decline that has occurred by the second quarter following the innovation). The predicted path of wages is above the +2s.e. boundary of the confidenm band in each of the quarters 4-7.
We find that a higher p alone, regardless of any markup real wage decline. The static model with a constant markup variation, helps p = 1.2 implies to explain the that the value added deflated wage eventually falls by -.06 percent for each percent increase in the price of oil. This response is inside, but near the edge of, the two standard error confidence band from the estimated response. The implicit collusion model predicts an even greater decline.
Indeed, in the case of p = 1.2, CM= .15, the predicted decline is even slightly greater than the estimated response in the second year. Furthermore, this model again predicts a much lgIn fact, the model predicts that markups actually fall in the quarter of the innovation, preventing any output decline at all. This is because Xt/Yt falls, due to the expectation of even higher energy prices in the next several quarters, despite the first effect mentioned, which raisea X~/Yt even in the first quarter.
sharper decline in the second year than in the first, so that the predicted path of wages tracks the estimated path re~onably well. The customer market model, by contrast, predicts the lowest real wage in the quarter of the innovation, with wages gradually returning to normal thereafter. Thus the implicit mllusion model again best matches the estimated reponse, although the predictions of all three imperfectly competitive models are within the confidena band in this c~e.
6
Conclusion
We have shown that imperfectly competitive models, and in particular a model involving implicit collusion in the product market, can explain the estimated effect of oil price increases on output and real wages to a much greater extent than can a stochastic growth model that assume a perfectly competitive product market. In this conclusion, we briefly discuss how our theory relates to other simple aggregative models which seek to explain for the output reductions that followed oil price incre~es.
It is sometimes argued that the recessions following the oil shocks of the 1970's were actually due to the tightening of monetary policy on these occasions, rather than an effect of the higher oil prices themselves. (See, e.g., Darby (1982) , Bohi (1989 ) .) From this point of view, our development of a non-monetary model with imperfect competition might seem to be unnecessary, and our analysis of the competitive case with no allowance either for a feedback rule for monetary policy or for nominal rigidities misleading. We cannot engage at this point in a complete discussion of models where money has important effects. But it does seem to us that models where monetary policy matters cannot avoid our conclusions, at least without adding considerable complications.
Suppose that over our sample period, oil price incre~es did lead systematically to redud growth of the money supply over subsequent quarters. Suppose furthermore that one were to model the real effmts of, changa in monetary policy by postulating imperfectly indexed nominal wage contracts. In this case the nmclassical labor supply curve would be repla~d by a perfectly elastic labor supply at a real wage that depends upon the nominal price level for non-energy output. In this case, an unexpectedly low money supply, and consequently an unexpectedly low nominal price level, would r-ult in a contraction of employment and output. But a condition like (5) would still apply (in the cwe that firms are perfect competitors in their product markets), and this contr~tion would occur only insofar as the rea,l wage divided by the ideal deflator for value added rose. Thus it is hard to see how the hypothesis of a coincident monetary tightening muld explain the sharp decline in real wages that accompania the observed contraction of output.
If one supposes that the real effects of monetary policy are instead due to nominal price rigidity, one probably has to consider models in which product markets are imperfectly competitive in the first plain (as in Rotemberg, 1982, and Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987) .
This still might seem an alternative to the particular kinds of imperfectly competitive models developed in this paper. However, as Blinder (1981) and Rotemberg (1983) A leading alternative hypothesis, of course, is that the aggregate effects of energy price increas~depend crucially upon the fact that such shocks affect different sectors differently.
Among this class of explanations, one must mention the sectoral reallocation model of Hamilton (1988) , w well as the sticky-price model of Ball and Mankiw (1992) . Here we discuss our estimates of the elasticities of substitution cEM and tvc, that are used in the simulations. We =timate th=e elasticities under the assumption of perfect competition, because we are especially concerned to mrrectly calibrate the mmpetitive model, the empirical inadequacy of which we document in this paper. The same parameter estimates are then used in all of the simulations, as we wish to display the consequenms of variations solely in our assumptions about markup determination. (We note, however, that assumption of a significant departure from perfect mmpetition ought to change our estimates and~vc as well.)
The elasticity cEM is defined as the coefficient in the log-linear approximation
Here AX denotes demeaned first difference of log X, for each of the variables. (Because our model implies that both E/M and G~/G~are stationary variables, such a log-linear approximation should be valid in the case of sufficiently small equilibrium fluctuations, for any smooth aggregator. If G is a CES function, of course, the log-linear relationship is exact, ) Cost minimization by firms then impli= that in equilibrium
This follows from equilibrium conditions (10) - (11 ) 
while AMt is constructed as indicated above. 21
We estimate equations (21) and (23) using the KLEMS data for 20 two-digit U.S. manufacturing sectors supplied by BLS Division of Productivity Research. We impose common elasticities on these 20 sectors to obtain relatively precise estimates that we can use in the calibration of our symmetric model. We have also examined independent sectoral regressions, and found quali tat ively similar results for most sectors, but with large standard errors for the coefficient estimat~.
We use the cumulative changa over two years for the growth rates appearing in those equations. We construct th=e two-year changes by summing the annual change for two consecutive years, where the annual changa are computed u indicated above. (We have data for 17 such periods, from 1950/51 through 1987/88.) Two-year growth rates are used because adjustment of the factor mix to relative pri~changes appears not to occur entirely within a single y-r. 22 Since our simulation exercise aims to explore the effects on the economy that occur during the first two years following an innovation in energy prices, we seek a medium term elasticity of substitution rather than one that is valid only for the first four quarters. Indeed, our figures show that the largest effects of energy price increase occur in the semnd year after the shock.
Finally, we allow for the possibility of stochastic variation in the aggregator functions Q and G, which would add error terms to equations (21) and (23). Hence, we de-trend (as well w de-meaning) all of our growth rates, and we estimate (21) and (23) with an instrumental variable estimator. The instrument is the growth of nominal oil prices over the same twoyear period. As discussed in the text, we regard this w a largely exogenous promss, and so 21Even though it is the Divisia version of the standard deflator of "value added", the second of these equations, is again valid only under the~umption of perfect competition,
The reason is, again, that we
USe cost sharea. 22When we experimented with one year chang~, we found the results much more sensitive to the normalization of the second stage regression because the instrument is much poorer. expect it to be unmrrelated with stochastic shocks in the Q and G aggregators, just as we expect it to be uncorrelated with the labor-augmenting technical shock variable z.
Regression coefficients for regr=sions of the left and right hand side of (21) and (23) We observe that the proposed instrument is a statistically significant predictor of all of the changes that we are interested in, except AE~-AM~. Even if this particular low tstatistic indicates that this is a poor choice of instrument (i.e., one not really correlated with the shifts we are interested in, and mrrelated with ApEt -ApMt for accidental reasons), then our use of it can bias our estimate of cEM towards zero.
The first-stage regressions just reported imply IV estimates of tEM = .177 and cvc = .686.
These are the baseline valu~used the previous two-year period as an these results. 23
in the paper. Using the change in the price of oil over additional instrument has no material consequenus on 'In general, the use of several instruments implies that the results depend on the side of the equation that projected against the instruments in the first stage.
In the cof~EM, the resulting estimate is 0.184 no matter which side of (21) is projected on the instruments.
The estimate of~vc equals 0.659 if (1 -.s~i)-lAs~t is projected on the instrumnti while it equals 0.670 if AG, -AM is projected. We prefer the estirnatea with only one instrument because the lagged oil price change doea not result in a significant coefficient in any of the first-stage regressions, except that for ApEi -ApMl. 
